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ABSTRACT 
 
Cooperative heuristics have traditionally been researched through the lens of 
standard dual-process models of cognition and from the perspective of 
evolutionary psychology. Despite the popularity of these approaches, research 
on intuitive versus extensional processing falls short in its endeavor to 
methodologically quantify heuristic processing and to empirically validate existing 
theories of social evaluation. Furthermore, several conceptualizations of the term 
heuristic have been proposed in the social psychology literature, leading to a lack 
of consensus on how cooperative heuristics function. To address these issues, 
the current study proposes a novel method for quantifying heuristic cognition. We 
propose a Bayesian cognition model of heuristics based on the free energy 
principle and present a framework for defining heuristics as Bayesian priors. To 
test our model, we ran an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk and used a 
modified version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Overall, the results of 
experiment supported our theoretical predictions and our quantitative model of 
cooperative heuristics.  Additionally, we found evidence to suggest that men and 
women respond differently to social uncertainty in cooperative exchanges. 
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The Effects of Uncertainty on Cooperation: 
Using Bayesian Cognition and Entropy to Model Cooperative Heuristics 
 
Introduction 
 
Cooperation and Intuitive Social Evaluations 
 
Human cooperation provides psychologists with an excellent opportunity 
to investigate how environmental input and social cognitive evaluations interact in 
daily social exchanges. Cooperation, described as a social interaction when 
individuals mutually incur some cost to benefit one another (Bowles & Gintis, 
2003; Boyd & Richerson 2009; Nowak, 2006), can be broken down into two 
related, yet distinct cognitive components (Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Zaki & 
Ochsner, 2011). Because cooperation is a two-sided relationship, the probability 
of cooperation occurring on one side of an exchange depends on a) the 
individual’s likelihood of cooperating with others as some statistical function of 
their past experiences (their prior beliefs), interacting with b) the individual’s 
subjective perception of the other(s) mutually cooperating with them in return (the 
social evaluation). Importantly cooperative interactions also occur at the group 
level and play an important role in the formation of social and cultural norms 
(Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2001). Mutual cooperation emerges in an 
interaction when both parties deem the other as trustworthy enough to bank on 
their social investment being returned.  
Importantly, cooperation is predicated upon trust emerging between both 
parties, which implies cooperative interactions involve some degree of social 
uncertainty (Yamagishi, 2011). Social uncertainty raises an important question 
about cooperative exchanges: given that humans must make decisions on a daily 
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basis of whether or not to trust and cooperate with others, from close kin to 
complete strangers and each of whom may have different incentives to 
cooperate in return, how does the human mind navigate through uncertain and 
often volatile social terrain? To explore this question requires an analysis of the 
intersection between the processing of uncertainty and social cognitive 
evaluations.  
 In their seminal article on cognitive judgments, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) assert that “uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of the human condition.” 
Following this conclusion, classic conceptualizations of how the human brain 
computes social judgments under uncertain conditions generally fall into two 
distinct categories: extensional versus intuitive reasoning. Extensional reasoning 
uses the general rules of statistics and the laws of probability to make inferences 
about belief (Goertzel,1993; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). Standard models use 
the laws of probability and the restrictions they impose on reality to make 
educated estimates of outcomes (see Adler, 2008, for an in-depth review). More 
recent and sophisticated models use Bayesian algorithms to make evaluative 
predictions based on belief updating in real time (described in more detail 
below)(Cunningham et al., 2007; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Friston 2010). 
However, to suggest the human brain uses formal statistical models to 
make precise estimates in daily interactions is an absurd position to hold, given 
that “people do not normally analyze daily events into exhaustive lists of 
possibilities (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).” Rather, the brain uses 
simpler informal models to organize information into generalized heuristics, also 
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known as intuitive reasoning. Additionally, researchers suggest fewer demands 
are placed on the nervous system when endless streams of complex stimuli are 
packaged into simple heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Kool, Shenhav, & Botvinick, 2017; Shenhav et al., 2017). 
However, the tradeoff between cognitive effort and accuracy results in systematic 
cognitive errors over time (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). A classic 
example of a heuristic error is the conjunction fallacy, in which the additive 
effectives of stereotype consistent information seems to make the possibility of 
an event more probable, when in actuality, adding more information or 
parameters to an event generally makes the event more improbable (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983).  
Placing intuitive reasoning in the context of evolution and cognition, 
Cosmides and Tooby (1994) assert that many of these heuristics are cognitive 
biases which were selected for through natural selection. The core argument for 
evolved cognitive biases challenges the classic behavioral and cognitive theories 
of cognition; these theories suggest the human brain operates as a content-
independent, general-purpose computer, in which cognitive processes are 
entirely molded by environmental input (see Pinker 2005 for an in-depth review; 
Skinner, 1963). Similar to the argument against extensional reasoning by 
Kahneman et al. (1982), evolutionary psychologists offer an important criticism of 
this approach in arguing how such a strategy is highly implausible given the 
complexity of information processing problems. Alternatively, humans have 
evolved “Darwinian algorithms.” These algorithms are specialized learning 
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mechanisms, evolved to organize information and experiences into meaningful 
frames and optimal response strategies. In other words, “adaptive behavior is 
predicated on adaptive thought”. Natural selection defines and places constraints 
on the way the world is structured in order to orient information processing 
systems towards an adaptive response (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Taken 
together, research from the perspectives of decision-making and evolutionary 
psychology provide a framework for understanding how environmental 
uncertainty is translated into heuristics, which tend to be adaptive responses on 
average.  
Applying evolutionary and decision-making theory to the moral domain, 
Haidt (1995) extends the logic of intuitive evaluation to the topic of evolutionarily 
endowed moral intuition. Siding with an argument against rational or extensional 
reasoning, Haidt asserts: “It would be strange if our moral judgment machinery 
was designed principally for accuracy, with no concern for the disastrous effects 
of periodically siding with our enemies and against our friends.” Put simply, the 
goal of human life as far as evolution is concerned, is to survive and reproduce. 
Thus, in many cases, it is simply more adaptive to be liked by members of our in-
group than to be objectively accurate in our social evaluations. Consequently, we 
should expect our moral intuitions to reflect adaptive social strategies rather than 
complete and accurate worldviews. As such, many social and evolutionary 
psychologists have suggested cooperation is a moral instinct, selected for to help 
humans live peacefully in groups (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby 
1989; Henrich 2004). Researchers argue that social exchange interactions were 
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a prominent feature of survival of reproduction in the early ancestral environment. 
Natural selection then, is expected to select for adaptive cognitive mechanisms 
to process information about these social exchanges. Additionally, humans 
possess cognitive heuristics that bias attention towards detecting cheaters and 
free riders in the environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fodor, 2000; 
Richerson, Boyd, & Henrich, 2003).  
Based on the presupposition of social interactions and evaluations being 
largely guided by evolutionarily shaped cognitive biases which aim to help 
individuals secure group benefits and simultaneously minimize cognitive 
processing demands, social psychologists have sought out empirical evidence to 
investigate whether cooperation is indeed, the intuitive response. Whether or not 
cooperation is an intuitive or extensional response becomes particularly 
interesting in one-shot anonymous economic games, where the individual has no 
reason to worry about reputational consequences or face retaliation for behaving 
selfishly. Findings consistently show that even when there are no perceivable 
consequences for behaving selfishly, participants still cooperate when there is 
absolutely no incentive to do so (Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Delton et al., 2011; 
Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993; Harrington, 1995). However, manipulating 
laboratory conditions such as forcing participants to delay their response, elicits 
more selfish behavior (Bear, Kagan, & Rand, 2017; Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 
2014).  Thus, where moral philosophers are interested in arguing whether 
humans are inherently good or evil, social psychologists are similarly interested 
in investigating whether humans are predisposed towards being more selfish or 
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cooperative. Evidence suggests participants tend to be more cooperative when 
making decisions under pressure and more selfish when free to think on their 
own accord, suggesting the intuitive response is indeed more cooperative (Cone 
& Rand, 2014; Duffy & Smith, 2014; Rand et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2014; 
Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). 1 
Methodological Issues: Rethinking Intuition and Cooperation 
Although research on intuitive cooperative responses has raised 
interesting questions, such as why humans would ever cooperate when there is 
no incentive to do so, and why time constraints manipulate cooperative behavior, 
there have been methodological challenges with this line of research.  
Firstly, psychologists have expressed some skepticism from the lack of research 
methodologically validating that participants are actually operating based on 
cognitive heuristics (see Tinghög et al., 2013, for an in-depth review). More 
specifically, researchers argue it is difficult to disentangle the effects produced 
from the experimental manipulation and the effects produced through employing 
intuitive versus extensional cognition (Evans, Dillon, & Rand, 2015). A recent 
study by Hutcherson, Boshong, and Rangel (2015) found evidence to suggest 
when participants play cooperative economic games under time pressure, they 
are simply more likely to make errors, inflating the type 1 error rate.  
Moreover, although different cooperative responses have been shown to emerge 
under different laboratory settings, the use of time pressure and cognitive load 																																								 																					1	Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug (2008) show that the intuitive, or “default” 
response is adapted to the cultural environment, so a predisposition for 
cooperation may be a joint project of heuristics and the nature of social exchange 
networks in a society.	
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manipulations are generally artificial settings. As such, from the findings of 
current studies it is difficult to derive a theory of when humans are motivated to 
construct a rational response versus relying on heuristic responses in daily 
interactions. 
Additionally, a major issue with researching cooperative behavior from a 
heuristic perspective is the broad range of definitions that are used 
interchangeably when discussing heuristics. The classic psychological definition 
of a heuristic is a psychological process in which a quick “gut response” is quite 
useful, but sometimes leads to severe and systematic cognitive errors 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). However, an opposing, yet equally 
prevalent psychological definition proposed by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) uses 
quantitative models to suggest heuristic responses are, when compared to 
standard benchmark strategies, faster, more frugal, and more accurate at the 
same time. Based on Gigerenzer and Todd’s model, heuristics represent an 
optimal point for maximizing accuracy while minimizing cognitive demand. 
Colloquial definitions often refer to heuristics as “cognitive shortcuts” or “intuitive 
judgments and decisions.” Therefore, because the classic definitions of heuristics 
are loose, often used interchangeably, and very abstract, heuristic cognition is 
difficult to quantify. Consequently, social psychological theories of intuitive 
evaluation are difficult to empirically validate. 
 Furthermore, although dual-process models serve as a useful blueprint for 
understanding the intuitive elements of social cognition, recent research seeks to 
expand on dual-process models by conceptualizing social evaluation as a 
7
	
	 15	
process that occurs along a temporal continuum, rather than the final product of 
mutually exclusive intuitive or extensional processes. Most prominently, 
researchers in social cognitive neuroscience argue that while there are likely 
different cognitive systems, a dual-process approach is highly oversimplified and 
does not reflect the more dynamic nature of underlying cognitive computations 
(Cunningham et al., 2007; Van Bavel, FeldmanHall, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015).  
Bayesian Models of Cognition and Evaluation 
As a partial solution, Bayesian approaches offer unprecedented 
opportunity for researchers to model cognitive dynamics in real time.  
Bayesian models of cognition are centered around the concept of beliefs being 
generated from the interaction between past observations and current 
environmental input; as the human brain integrates current information, prior 
beliefs and assumptions are updated in order to generate more informative and 
accurate future predictions. Bayesian inference is a statistical approach 
predicated on subjective conditional probabilities (Bayes, 1763). For example, 
when an individual encounters a novel situation, such as the probability that it will 
snow in a city they are visiting for the first time, the individual will reason about 
this probability using prior information (the prior distribution). In this case, the 
individual’s prior distribution would likely reflect the probability of snow in one’s 
hometown, with a perhaps a slight adjustment to the distribution given known 
information about weather in the region. If however, it snows heavily on the first 
day of the individual’s visit, this data, called the likelihood function, informs what 
the person now believes about weather in that particular city. Consequently, their 
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prediction about future visits to the city (the posterior distribution) will likely reflect 
a bias towards predicting snowy weather, independent of the actual probability 
that it will snow in that city (Friston 2012; McElreath 2016; see Adler, 2008 for an 
in-depth review of the Bayesian tradition). Therefore, rather than functioning as 
completely objective models of environmental contingencies, Bayesian models 
accommodate for current beliefs given subjective experiences. Additionally, 
Bayesian models are particularly useful tools for psychologists because they 
make little to no assumptions about the distribution or variance of the data.  
Capitalizing on the dynamic nature of Bayesian inference models, the 
Iterative Reprocessing Model (IR) (Cunningham, Dunfield, & Stillman, 2013; 
Cunningham et al., 2007; Cunningham & Zelazo 2007) is rooted in the Bayesian 
tradition of subjective belief updating and holds promise for insight into the 
cognitive underpinnings of social evaluation. The IR model proposes the brain is 
hierarchically organized into distinct, yet interconnected neural network systems, 
which aim to integrate incoming information in two ways: lower-order neural 
network systems receive immediate input from sensory and motor areas and 
delegate the information to higher-order processing networks in the prefrontal 
cortex. An evaluative response is composed while additional incoming 
information is integrated into the existing evaluation. This cycling of information 
between lower and higher order networks is referred to as iteration. According to 
the IR model, fewer iterations produce short-term evaluations (the posterior), 
which tend to be computationally cheap and generally reflect existing cognitive 
biases. However, additional iterations not only produce more nuanced and 
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accurate evaluations, but the information from the current evaluation (the 
likelihood function) also becomes integrated into the individual’s long-term, stable 
working model, known as an attitude (the prior). A key element to the IR model is 
the requirement of motivational states, such as obtaining a goal or being in a 
particular emotional state, for addition iterations to occur (Cunningham et al., 
2007; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). Therefore, social cognitive evaluations exist 
along a continuum of raw-input, visceral responses to highly processed and 
rational responses, as a function of the number of iterations that occur over time.  
A dynamic model of social evaluation may be particularly useful for 
understanding the social cognitive mechanisms of cooperative exchanges where 
individuals likely experience varying levels of motivation to process uncertainty. 
For the rest of this paper, we explore a Bayesian approach for quantifying the 
conditions under which individuals are more or less likely to rely on heuristics and 
whether our model can predict when extensional versus intuitive processing 
occurs.  
Current Study 
A Return to the Study of Uncertainty 
The goal of the current study is twofold. The first goal is to articulate a 
logical, precise, and empirically testable definition of a cognitive heuristic to be 
applied to cooperative behavior and social evaluation. The second goal is to 
propose a method for quantifying heuristic processing and testing its effects on 
the social evaluative perceptions of others. In doing so, we hope to explore 
questions of when the human brain is motivated to process uncertainty in the 
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environment versus relying on a heuristic response and how environmental 
uncertainty interacts with social evaluations. Additionally, we argue that Bayesian 
models of cognition can be integrated with insights from evolutionary psychology 
to produce a cohesive framework for understanding cooperation in the modern 
context. Integrating these concepts as they apply to our study of cooperation is 
elucidated on below.  
The Evolved Bayesian Brain: A Domain-General Theory  
Where previous theories of cooperative heuristics have focused almost 
exclusively on domain-specific theories of evolved cooperative biases, such 
theories must assume that content-instantiated heuristics are propagated across 
generations of offspring. Despite the likelihood that domain-specific biases exist, 
currently there are no known biological mechanisms that could build content-
based cognitive adaptions into the brain. Based on this limitation of domain-
specific theories, domain-general approaches should be preferred, given that 
they make fewer content-instantiated assumptions and still account for a wide 
range of cognitive biases and behaviors. 
Bayesian cognition is a strong candidate for adaptive cognition, as natural 
selection would likely select for generalized cognitive machinery that allows an 
organism to generate more accurate future-oriented predictions. Cognitive 
machinery that organizes environmental input into future predictions produces 
adaptive behavior in response to dynamically shifting information. In line with this 
reasoning, Bayesian cognition is likely to play a strong role in social evaluation 
and cooperative decision-making, as well as a host of other social behaviors. 
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Using a Bayesian framework, it would follow that there is also some level of 
cognitive effort or cost associated with updating predictions. Because processing 
a continual stream of information from the environment is cognitively taxing, 
evolution should select for basic cognitive heuristics or biases that function as 
informative priors in order to minimize processing demands and conserve energy 
for other tasks.  
Thinking along these lines, whereas previous research has focused 
almost exclusively on the notion of an evolved cooperative heuristics functioning 
as a default social prior, it is not currently well understood when the brain seeks 
out these heuristics and what circumstances motivate more nuanced processing 
and updating. One major overlooked and interesting factor to consider in 
studying a cooperative interaction is how volatility, the uncertainty that exist 
around switching between particular behavioral states, as an environmental 
factor modulates when heuristics are sought out and when updating is preferred. 
Additionally, we propose that the human brain has built-in cognitive biases for 
dealing with perceived volatility.  
Study Hypotheses: Volatility 
Based on concepts from Bayesian models of cognition and evolutionary 
theory, in this paper we propose two hypothesizes associated with volatility and 
cooperation.  
Hypothesis 1. Firstly, we predict that under uncertain or volatile 
conditions, humans are more likely to rely on cooperative heuristics (the precise 
definition we use of heuristics in this study will be explained in more detail 
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below). This hypothesis is predicated on the logic that humans implicitly scan for 
relative levels of uncertainty in their environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Munier, 1989; Sorrentino, 1986). We predict that 
when volatility is detected as high, the brain defaults to using priors to create a 
channel for noisy incoming social information. Conversely, when volatility is low, 
the brain defaults to learning environmental contingencies and updates its priors 
accordingly. 
Hypothesis 2. Secondly, we predict that as an evolved cognitive bias, 
humans have an aversion to volatility in social exchanges and consequently 
perceive volatile individuals more negatively. As a key part of our hypothesis, we 
propose that even objectively neutral agents who cooperate and defect with 
equal probability would be perceived more negatively simply because their 
decisions are unpredictable. This hypothesis is based on Yamagishi’s (2011) 
concept of trust involving some degree of social uncertainty. Therefore, we 
predict that because volatile individuals are more unpredictable, volatility 
impedes trust and leads to negative perceptions of the individual even when they 
are objectively neutral.  
Entropy and the Free-Energy Principle 
Cohesively, our conceptualization of heuristics as informative priors under 
uncertain conditions integrates well with Friston’s (2010) Bayesian model of 
entropy. Although Friston’s model is asocial and does not make any specific 
hypotheses about social evaluation, we propose that this model can be adapted 
for quantifying heuristic processes and social evaluation.  
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The free-energy (entropy) principle is based on the biological assertion 
that all adaptive systems (such as biological agents, animals, or brains) must 
possess some mechanism to resist a natural tendency to disorder. Given the 
level of disorder and uncertainty that exists in the physical universe, biological 
systems must maintain relatively stable states in a constantly changing 
environment. From the perspective of the brain, the environment includes both 
external and internal disorder. The phenotype of the organism provides a set of 
physiological bounds on disorder within which an organism must stay.  
High entropy states refer to disordered or chaotic states in which there is 
too much uncertainty in the environment for an organism to adaptively function 
(i.e., the organism is unable to produce an adaptive response due to high 
physiological arousal and high computational demand). Entropy (or uncertainty) 
according to the free-energy framework comes from two sources of input: the 
internal and the external environment. The entropy from the external environment 
can be calculated simply using the information entropy criterion (H), in which the 
uncertainty contained in a probability distribution is the average log probability of 
an event. For example, if an event such as the probability of snow on a particular 
day in Toronto was p=.45, entropy in the external environment produced by the 
uncertainty around snowfall can be calculated using the equation (as cited in 
McElreath, 2016, p.178): 
       
 
However, because entropy also contains an internal component, total 
H (p) = −E log(pi ) = −Σi=1
n
pi log(pi )
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entropy must include the subjective state of the individual. Total entropy is 
minimized when an accurate internal model is used to predict the external model. 
However, total entropy increases in magnitude to the extent that the internal 
model deviates from the true model and uses inaccurate estimates to make 
predictions. Kullback-Liebler Divergence can be computed to estimate how much 
additional uncertainty is introduced when using inaccurate model parameters to 
predict outcomes when the true parameters of the environment are known. For 
example, if one believes that it will snow with a probability of q1= .3, and not snow 
with a probability of q2=.7 but the true values of snowing and not snowing are 
p1=.20, and p2=.80, respectively, additional uncertainty or divergence, can be 
calculated using the equation (as cited in McElreath, 2016, p.179): 
 
 
Therefore, total entropy is equal to entropy from the external environment and 
additional entropy from the internal environment:  
Total Entropy = H(p) + DKL 
Based on this premise, the human brain strives to maintain a state of low 
entropy by continuously minimizing the level of surprise or entropy in their 
environment. How then, do organisms adaptively avoid uncertain states? Friston 
(2010) asserts that when chaos or disorder cannot be changed or manipulated in 
the external environment, agents resist disorder by changing their perceptions. 
Free-energy can be reduced by changing expectations through conditionally and 
selectively sampling information from the environment such that is conforms to 
DKL (p,q) = pi
i
∑ (log(pi )− log(qi )) = pii∑ log
pi
qi
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
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an internal model of prior beliefs. The key point is that this is a subjective state of 
stability in the mind of the organism that is comfortable, independent of the level 
of uncertainty that actually exists in the environment, internally and externally. 
Study Hypotheses: Entropy 
Hypothesis 3. Using the free energy model to guide our hypotheses, we 
predict that as a general principle, humans are more likely to rely on heuristics in 
cooperative interactions when entropy in the environment is high. To test our 
hypothesis that participants increasingly rely on heuristic processing as total 
entropy increases, we will need to define and quantify both heuristic processing 
and entropy. In this experiment, we conceptualize heuristic processing as 
occurring when an agent has an internal working model of the world that it uses 
to guide its beliefs and behavior. Importantly, agents will selectively sample 
information from the environment that is consistent with their internal working 
model in order to minimize free energy (i.e. surprise) when uncertainty is high. 
Such a process can be thought of as internally creating order out of chaos.  
Based on this definition of heuristics, it would follow that an individual is 
using heuristics, or relying on a somewhat fixed internal working model of the 
world, when they display evidence of adhering to this internal model, even after 
being presented with conflicting and inconsistent information. Maintaining an 
incorrect internal model after inconsistent information is presented suggests that 
the individual is selectively processing information from the environment that is 
consistent with their heuristic in order to internally achieve stability and minimize 
processing demands. Evidence of deviating from the internal model after 
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observing conflicting information suggests more nuanced processing is 
occurring, more akin to extensional processing. 
As mentioned previously, in the current study we are interested in testing 
the following hypotheses: firstly, we will test our core study theoretical hypothesis 
that volatile environments predict the extent to which participants make heuristic 
judgments, and secondly, the degree of volatility of the other individual in the 
exchange predicts how negatively they are perceived. Additionally, we are 
interested in testing our method for quantifying reliability on heuristics by using 
the entropy models described above. We predict that as overall entropy 
increases (i.e., individuals are using incorrect internal models to make guesses 
about the environment) uncertainty is detected and as a consequence the brain 
relies on making a heuristic evaluation.  
To test our hypotheses we ran an online experiment through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. In this experiment we programmed a simple modified version 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where participants played against a volatile agent, 
that they were told was a real human being online. Volatility was manipulated in 
experimental conditions and entropy involved in individual social exchanges was 
calculated to test our models. Details of the experiment are described below in 
more detail.  
Method 
Participants 
156 participants (68 women, 88 men) were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and received monetary compensation for study 
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participation. 14 participants were dropped from statistical analysis after data 
collection using the exclusion criteria of making the same decision consecutively 
on all or 79/80 trials, suggesting that they were simply clicking through the 
experiment2. Final analyses consisted of 142 participants (63 women, 79 men). 
Study participation was restricted to workers in the United States and all 
participants were screened in order to ensure they are above the legal 
consenting age of 18. Testing took place over 5 consecutive days (Sunday-
Thursday) and commenced at 10:00am and was shut off at 12:00am for each 
day of testing. Additional security blockers were set up to screen-out reoccurring 
IP addresses and worker ID numbers to prevent participants from completing the 
experiment more than once. All participants were randomly assigned to a 
counter-balanced condition within each experimental group and were debriefed 
on the study’s purpose and intention at the end of the experiment.  
Participant Compensation 
All participants that met the criteria of living in the United States, being 
over 18 years old and not participating in the study previously, were permitted to 
read the experiment instructions. To ensure that all participants understood the 
nature of the task, participants were required to answer a question about the 
study instructions correctly in order to enter the experiment. All participants that 
completed the question correctly were paid a $1.00 show-up fee for the 
experiment. Additionally, participants were given the opportunity to earn up to 
																																								 																					
2 All analyses were also conducted with dropped participants included; analysis 
results were not affected by excluding non-compliant participants.  
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$1.60 of bonus payment depending on the decisions they made in the game. The 
mean payout to participants, including bonus payment was $2.00 (SD = 0.39).  
Experiment Design 
Game. The experiment consisted of an economic game that participants 
played with a hypothetical stranger online. In this game, participants were told 
that they were playing with an individual named Chris over the Internet. However, 
rather than playing with a human, participants were playing against a computer 
whose moves were pre-generated through a random algorithm, depending on the 
experimental condition.  
A name was assigned to the computer in order add authenticity to the 
game-playing experience for the participant3. Participants were told that the 
purpose of the game is to accrue as many points as possible, as points will be 
translated into payout at the end of the experiment. The game used in this 
experiment was a modified version of the prisoner’s dilemma game, in which 
participants make a series of independent cooperative decisions.  
All participants started the game with 100 points. They were told that they 
were guaranteed at least 100 points to cash-out with at the end of the 
experiment, as it covers the basic show-up fee of $1.00. On each trial thereafter 
(participants played 80 rounds total), the participant could choose to either 
cooperate or defect; if they chose to cooperate, they paid 20 points in order to 																																								 																					3	We decided to use a common name that participants could reasonably expect to come 
across. While we acknowledge that using a masculine name may influence social 
judgments, we decided against using a gender neutral name given previous evidence 
that participants generally assume gender-unspecified targets to be men (e.g., Schug, 
Alt, & Klauer, 2015). 		
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give Chris 40 points. Similarly, on each trial, Chris could choose to cooperate and 
pay 20 points to give the participant 40 points. Alternatively, on each trial the 
participant and Chris could choose to defect and pay 0 points while still collected 
the points from the other player if they chose to cooperate. Based on the number 
of points accrued during the game, participants were paid 10 cents for every 10 
points they collected beyond the 100 point mark. Figure 1 below shows the 
different scenarios that could occur during the game, as they were presented to 
the participant in the instructions section.  
 
 
Figure 1: Cooperative exchange scenario as presented to participants during experiment instructions. 
Participants were shown payoff structure associated with cooperating and defecting with opponent and 
consequences of opponent decisions.  
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On each round, participants were told to make a decision independently 
while Chris also made his decision simultaneously. After participants submitted 
their decision, they were notified of the results on that round and were informed 
of Chris’s decision and how many points they earned. To add authenticity to the 
feeling that participants were playing against a human, after participants 
submitted their decision, the waiting time for the results presented with a note 
saying “waiting for Chris to respond”, which was randomly pulled for a distribution 
of response times of 0-2 seconds on 50% of trials. Thus, half the time it would 
seem that Chris had already made his decision and half of the time the 
participant would seem to make their decision first.  
Conditions. We programmed three experimental conditions that 
corresponded to the degree of volatility of Chris’s cooperative decisions (see 
figures 3-5 below). The y-axis below represents the probability that Chris will 
cooperate on any given trial, using p = (.35, .65). For example, if the blue line 
corresponds to p=.35, Chris’s probability of cooperating on that trial will be pulled 
from a binomial distribution where the probability of cooperating is .35 and the 
Figure 2: Screen displaying a single round during the game, in which participants were asked to 
cooperate or defect. The figure on the right shows results after participants submitted their decision on the 
previous round. 
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probability of defecting is .65 (1-p). We chose these probabilities after piloting 
with probabilities between .2-.4, and found that p = .35 and .65 provide enough 
variability to reliably convince participants that they were playing against a 
human but are consistent enough to create a sense of being cooperated with or 
defected against over a series of trials.  
Although Chris’s probability of cooperating on a given trial oscillates to 
varying degrees across experimental conditions, critically, across all conditions 
the average probability of cooperation across the entire game is exactly p=.50. 
Thus, regardless of volatility (the number of times Chris’s probability of 
cooperating switches from high to low, or low to high), across all experimental 
conditions and averaged across all trials, Chris’s probability of cooperating is 
fixed at p=.50. Therefore, the number of points distributed to participants by Chris 
did not vary by experimental condition. The purpose of manipulating volatility by 
increasing the number of oscillations around the fixed parameter .5 is to increase 
volatility and total entropy across conditions without changing the probability of 
reward. Additionally, within each experimental condition, starting probabilities  
were counter-balanced at p=.35 and p=.65. 
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Figure 3: Probability structure used in Condition 1 used as control condition. Agent responses were 
set to p = .35 for the first 40 trials with a single switch at trial 40 to p=.65. Belief updating scores 
were only used after trial 50.  
Figure 4: Probability structure used in Condition 2. Three switches were programmed at trials 20, 
40, and 60. Belief updating scores were only used after trial 30.  
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Probability estimates & social evaluation. Participants were also asked 
to provide their best estimate of Chris’s probability of cooperating with them 
every 10 trials, and provided a total of 8 estimates for the entire experiment. 
Estimates were provided on a slider set to 50% as the default and participants 
were encouraged at each reporting time to be as accurate as possible about their 
estimates. Taken together, the basic flow of the experiment was that participants 
were asked to go through instructions in detail, answered a quiz question 
correctly or were removed from the experiment, made an independent decision 
to cooperate or defect on each round and were notified of the results of the round 
after submitting their decision. Participants played 80 rounds total and filled out a 
prediction report every 10 rounds. At the end of the game, participants were 
Figure 5: Probability structure used in Condition 3, with 7 switches programmed at trials 10, 20, 
30, 40, 50, 60, and 70. Belief updating scores were only used after trial 20.  
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asked to provide a judgment of Chris’s behavior. More specifically, participants 
were asked to report if they thought Chris was “a cooperator (someone who 
gives to others)”, “a defector (someone who is selfish)”, or “neither”.  
 
 
Quantifying Constructs and Calculations 
Belief updating. After the first 10 trials of the experiment, we assumed 
that participants would have formed a subjective internal model of Chris’s 
behavior. Thus, the initial report at t1 corresponds to an initial heuristic of Chris as 
either a cooperator, defector, or neither, with some given level of uncertainty. The 
critical measure of the degree to which participants are updating their beliefs 
from t1 to ti, can be captured by measuring the magnitude of change in their 
estimate (Δe), after observing conflicting information. For example, in the low 
volatility condition, there should be little change in the estimate from t1 to t2 
Figure 6: Display showed to participants during instructions section to demonstrate 
how to report estimates of agent’s cooperative behavior.  
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because information observed between reports should be consistent, thus little 
change should occur. However, after observing behavior that is inconsistent with 
the belief at t5, the degree to which the participant changes their response 
provides an estimate of their reliance on the initial heuristic. For this reason, Δe 
scores are not calculated until after inconsistent information (the switch in p) is 
presented in each condition. Reliance on heuristics was calculated as |Δe| for 
each participant; an absolute value is used to denote that the direction of change 
in the update does not factor into the analysis. A lower |Δe| score reflected little 
change in estimates after observing conflicting information, whereas higher |Δe| 
scores corresponded to more updating as signified through more change in 
reported estimates after observing inconsistent information. 
Entropy. Entropy was calculated using the H criterion and Kullback-
Liebler Divergence with the formulas cited above. External entropy was 
calculated using Chris’s probability of cooperating on any particular trial and was 
calculated using the H criterion. Internal entropy was calculating using the 
probability estimates that participants reported after observing a switch and was 
calculated using Kullback-Liebler Divergence. For example, if one believes that 
Chris will cooperate with a probability of q1= .1, and defect with a probability of 
q2=.9 but the true values of cooperating and defecting are p1=.35, and p2=.65, 
respectively, additional uncertainty or divergence with be calculated using the KL 
Divergence equation. Total Entropy was calculated as: 
Entropy = H(p) + DKL 
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Experiment Predictions and Plan for Data Analysis 
Demographic variables 
For all hypotheses and analyses conducted we planned to look at gender 
and age as covariates in our models, as research suggests gender and age are 
known to effect cooperative decisions and evaluations (Orbell, Dawes, & 
Schwartz-Shea, 1994; Schwieren, & Sutter, 2008; Sutter & Kocher, 2007). We 
note that that we did not have any directional predictions for how gender or age 
would factor into our models. No effects of age were found so they were removed 
as a covariate from our analyses and were not included in our plan for data 
analysis below. Gender effects were found for our volatility hypotheses and were 
included post-hoc as covariates in our planned models below.  
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that under uncertain or volatile conditions, humans 
are more likely to rely on cooperative heuristics. An important point about our 
analysis is how we chose to define heuristic response. In our analyses, a 
heuristic response was coded as true if participants responded “cooperator” or 
“defector” during their evaluation and was coded as false if participants 
responded “neither.” Therefore, in our analysis, because the objective/true 
evaluation of the agent was neither, any responses that deviated from this 
answer were theoretically viewed as formed from a heuristic bias.  
Analysis 1. To test predictions from hypothesis 1, we conducted a 
multilevel logistic regression on heuristic response using gender, agent starting 
probability, and experimental condition as fixed effects, and using subject as a 
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random factor. We predicted that participants would be more likely to rely on 
cooperative heuristics in moderate and high volatility conditions.  
Analysis 2. Additionally, we sought to ensure that any effects associated 
with differential heuristic responses across conditions were due to our volatility 
manipulation as opposed to participants cooperating more or less across 
conditions. To test this prediction, we conducted a multilevel logistic regression 
on participant cooperation using gender, agent probability during task, and 
experimental condition as fixed effects, and using subject as a random factor.  
Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that humans have an aversion to volatility in social 
exchanges and consequently perceive volatile individuals more negatively. In our 
analyses, agent evaluation factored in the content of the social evaluation, as 
“cooperator,” “defector,” or “neither,” as opposed to dichotomizing them into 
heuristic or non-heuristic responses in Analysis 2.  
Analysis 3. To test this prediction we conducted a multilevel logistic 
regression on agent evaluation using gender, agent starting probability, and 
experimental condition as fixed effects, and using subject as a random factor. We 
predicted that participants would be more likely to respond “defector” as volatility 
increased across conditions. 
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Hypothesis 34 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that participants increasingly rely on heuristic 
processing as belief updating decreases and total entropy increases. These 
analyses use the method described above for quantifying belief updating and 
entropy.  
Analysis 4. Analysis 4 tested a core model assumption, that participants 
were less likely to update beliefs when entropy was high. The test this prediction, 
we ran a multilevel mixed model on belief updating using entropy as a level 1 
predictor, experimental condition as a fixed effect, and using subject as a random 
factor. 
Analysis 5. To test hypothesis 3, that entropy and belief updating would 
predict heuristic processing in participants, we ran a multilevel logistic regression 
on heuristic response using entropy and belief updating as level 1 predictor 
variables, condition as a fixed effect, and using subject as a random factor. Here, 
heuristic response was coded as described in analysis 2, such that a heuristic 
response was denoted by responding “cooperator” or “defector” and a non-
heuristic response was denoted by responding “neither.” 
Analysis 6. Additionally, we wanted to test if our model could predict the 
content of evaluations made by our participants (i.e. if they responded 
“cooperator,” “defector,” or “neither”). To test our hypothesis that belief updating 																																								 																					4	*Note: there was no crossover between predictor variables in analyses 1-3 and 
analyses 4-6, except for experimental condition. Additionally, note that all data 
(all 80 rounds for all conditions) were used in analyses 1-3, whereas analysis 4-6 
used a partial data set where only estimates reported after observing inconsistent 
information (the initial switch in agent probability) were used. See method section 
on belief updating and entropy for more information. Condition 1 was also used 
as the reference group across all analyses since this was our control condition.	
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and entropy would predict agent evaluations, we ran a multilevel multinomial 
logistic regression on agent evaluation, using belief updating and entropy as level 
1 predictors, condition as the fixed effect, and using subject as a random factor. 
In line with prediction 2, we predicted that participants that were inclined to make 
heuristic evaluations would be more likely to respond defector, as we predict 
humans have an evolved aversion to volatile individuals. 
Software 
 All data was processed and analyzed used R statistical software, using 
packages “lme4,” “effects,” “nnet,” “foreign,” and “stargazer.” Additionally, all 
models were checked for converging results in SPSS.  
Results5 
 
																																								 																					
5All coefficients and significance values are reported in Appendix,  
Tables 2-8.  
Results Tables
Amrita Lamba
Using the Free-Energy Principle to Model Cooperative Heuristics
under Uncert inty
1 Experiment Statistics
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Heuristic response 0.542 0.498 0 1
Agent prob. 0.500 0.150 0.350 0.650
Participant cooperation 7.710 9.735 0 20
Agent cooperation 9.944 10.000 0 20
Participant RT (ms) 1,943.983 6,388.901 507.170 536,313.400
Participant payment 1.998 0.387 1.100 2.780
Note: N=142(63 women,79 men)
1
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Participant probability report 0.373 0.218 0.010 1.000
Heuristic response 0.552 0.498 0 1
H crit 0.647 0.000 0.647 0.647
Kullback-Leibler divergence 0.369 0.415 0.000 2.713
Entropy 1.016 0.415 0.647 3.361
Belief update 0.131 0.164 0.000 1.000
Table 6: Analysis 4 Results: Multilevel Model Predicting Belief Updating with
Entropy as Level 1 Predictor, Condition as Fixed Effect, and Subject as Ran-
dom Effect
Dependent variable:
Belief updating
Entropy -0.130⇤⇤⇤
(0.047)
Condition -0.020
(0.024)
Entropy:Condition 0.032
(0.021)
Constant 0.238⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
Observations 763
Log Likelihood 327.732
Akaike Inf. Crit. -643.464
Bayesian Inf. Crit. -615.641
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
5
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Hypothesis  
Analysis 1. For analysis 1 we ran a multilevel logistic regression on 
participant cooperation using gender, agent probability during task, and 
experimental condition as fixed effects and using subject as a random factor 
(overall model log likelihood = -6 187.100). Consistent with our study predictions, 
there was no significant main effect of condition on cooperative behavior (see 
figure 7 and table 2). There was a significant main effect of agent probability 
during the task on cooperative behavior (β = 1.183, p<.01), with participants 
cooperating significantly more when the agent was fixed at p=.65 compared to 
p=.35. There was also a significant interaction between the agent probability at 
p=.65 and moderate volatility and high volatility conditions, (β = -0.357, p<.05) 
and (β = -0.369, p<.05), respectively, with participants cooperating significantly 
less when the agent was fixed at p=0.65 (see figure 8).  
Figure 7: Line graph displaying mean participant cooperative decisions across experimental 
conditions. Mean cooperative behavior did not differ between conditions. 
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There was also a significant interaction between gender and agent 
probability at p=.65 (β = -0.354, p<.05), with males cooperating significantly less 
than females when p=.65.  
 
 
Analysis 2. For analysis 2 we ran a multilevel logistic regression on 
heuristic response to agent behavior using gender, agent starting probability, and 
experimental condition as fixed effects and using subject as a random factor 
(overall model log likelihood = -111.832). There a significant main effect of 
gender (β = 25.054, p<.01), with males significantly more likely than females to 
make a heuristic judgment. Consistent with study predictions, there was also a 
significant condition effect, with participants in moderate and high volatility 
conditions significantly more likely to make a heuristic judgment (β = 26.527, 
p<.01) and (β = 25.979, p<.01), respectively (see table 3). There was a 
Figure 8: Effects plot displaying three-way interaction between agent cooperative 
probabilities and participant cooperative decisions across groups and by gender. 
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significant interaction between gender and the moderate volatility condition (β =  -
25.76, p<.05), with females significantly more likely than males to make a 
heuristic response under moderate volatility. There was also a significant 
interaction between agent starting probability of p=.65 and the high volatility 
condition (β =-29.157, p<.01), with participants significantly more likely to make a 
heuristic response. Lastly, there a significant three-way interaction between 
gender, agent starting probability of p=.65, and the high volatility condition  
(β = -20.269, p<.05), with men under high volatility significantly more likely to 
make a heuristic evaluation than females.  
Hypothesis 2 
Analysis 3. For analysis 3 we ran a multilevel multinomial logistic 
regression on agent evaluation using gender, agent starting probability, and 
experimental condition as fixed effects and using subject as a random factor 
(overall model Akaike inf. crit. = 20 008.720).  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Effects plot displaying three-way interaction between participant 
gender, agent evaluation and experimental conditions.   33
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Consistent with study predictions, we found significant main effects of 
condition, agent starting probability, gender, all 2-way and three-way interactions 
were also significant. To avoid redundancy, please refer to Appendix, table 4 for 
exact statistics and p values.  
Hypothesis 3 
Analysis 4. For analysis 4 we ran a multilevel mixed model on belief 
updating using entropy and experimental condition as fixed effects and using 
subject as a random factor (overall model log likelihood = 327.732). Consistent 
with our core study assumption, there was a significant main effect of entropy on 
belief updating (β = -0.130, p<.01) (see table 6).  
Figure 10: Bar graph display percentage agent evaluations by gender group and experimental 
condition. Effects show significant three-way interaction.  
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Analysis 5. For analysis 5 we ran a multilevel logistic regression on 
heuristic response using entropy, condition, and belief updating as fixed effects 
and using subject as a random factor (overall model log likelihood = -120.287). 
Consistent with study predictions, there was a significant main effect of entropy 
on heuristic response, with (β = -16.305, p<.05). Additionally, consistent with 
study predictions there was a significant two-way interaction between entropy 
and condition (β = 7.769, p<.05). 
Analysis 6. For analysis 6 we ran a multilevel multinomial logistic 
regression on agent evaluation, using belief updating, entropy and condition as 
fixed effects and using subject as a random factor (overall model Akaike Inf. Crit. 
= 1 449.89). Contrary to study predictions, the overall model did not predict agent 
evaluations using belief updating, entropy, and condition as predictor variables. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Effects plot showing relationship between entropy scores and 
belief updating collapsed across experimental condition.    
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Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 
 In summary, hypothesis 1 predicted that under volatile conditions, humans 
are more likely to rely on cooperative heuristics. The results of analysis 2 
supported our predictions, as there was a significant main effect of condition on 
heuristic judgment. Overall participants were more likely to perceive Chris as a 
cooperator or defector, as opposed to neither in moderate and high volatility 
conditions. This suggests that manipulating volatility while keep Chris’s 
contributions consistent across conditions, predicted whether or not participants 
were inclined to make a heuristic judgment at the end of the experiment. Analysis 
1 also supported our prediction that the main effect of condition on heuristic 
judgment was not being driven by a difference in cooperative behavior across 
conditions, as there was no significant main effect condition on participant 
cooperation.  
 Additionally, our results suggest there is an interesting interaction between 
gender and heuristic judgment. Our findings from analysis 1 replicate findings in 
the literature that women on average, tend to more cooperative and trusting than 
men (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1995; Rand 2016; Rand et al., 2016; Vugt, 
Cremer, & Janssen, 2007). However, as a novel finding, analysis 2 suggests that 
women were significantly more likely than men to make a heuristic evaluation 
under moderately volatile conditions, whereas men were significantly more likely 
than women to make a heuristic evaluation under high volatility conditions. As 
figure 9 shows, women were far more likely to recognize Chris as neither a 
cooperator nor defector under high volatility. This finding suggests that women 
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were more likely to learn Chris’s behavior under high volatility conditions than 
men, yet were slightly more susceptible than men to making heuristic evaluation 
under moderately volatile conditions. Men however, were about equally likely to 
make a heuristic evaluation under moderate and high volatility conditions. These 
results may suggest that men and women are sensitive to different levels of 
environmental uncertainty. This finding may align with research on gender 
differences in trust (Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2003; Maddux & Brewer, 2005; 
Wang & Yamagishi, 2005). Research findings that suggest women are more 
trusting than men in social interactions imply that women and men process social 
uncertainty differently. However, further research is needed to understand the 
degree to which men and women differ in processing social uncertainty and 
under what contexts this effect emerges. As a future direction, it may be 
interesting to explore whether men and women have different optimal points for 
heuristic evaluation and if such differences exist, whether this difference has an 
adaptive value for social exchanges.  
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that humans have an aversion to uncertainty and 
consequently perceive volatile individuals more negatively. Consistent with our 
predictions, analysis 3 showed that participants were more likely to rate Chris as 
a defector under volatile conditions compared to the control condition (see 
Figures 9 and 10). Additionally, although men and women cooperated equally 
across experimental conditions (see analysis 1 and Figure 8), both men and 
women cooperated less with Chris when p=.65, as volatility increased (see 
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Figure 7). This finding suggests that participants were less forgiving to Chris as 
volatility increased across conditions. Interestingly, Chris was also less likely to 
be viewed as a defector under low volatility than moderate volatility conditions, 
even though for half of the participants in the low volatility condition, Chris 
frequently defected (p of cooperation = .35) for the last 40 rounds before 
participants made their social evaluation of Chris. This effect may suggest that 
volatility signifies the other as untrustworthy, even when the other cooperates as 
frequently as less volatile individuals. We suspect that this cognitive bias was 
selected for to alert humans to untrustworthy individuals in the group.  
Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants increasingly rely on heuristic 
processing as belief updating decreases and total entropy increases. Overall, our 
model was able to use belief updating and total entropy to significantly predict 
whether or not participants made a heuristic evaluation (see analysis 5). 
Additionally, analysis 4 supported the underlying assumption of our model, that 
participants would update their beliefs less as total entropy increased (see Figure 
11). We believe that this finding is a particularly novel contribution to the 
cooperation and social evaluation literature, as no studies so far have used 
subjective probability estimates to reliably predict whether or not participants 
were susceptible to making an objective or heuristic evaluation. These findings 
suggest that humans are able to detect when priors are worth updating and when 
belief updating is not worth the additional cognitive effort. Collectively, these 
findings may provide a framework for a social information optimal foraging theory 
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(Charnov, 1976; Hill, Jones, & Todd, 2012; McNamara & Houston, 1985), in 
which individuals make tradeoffs between learning about their social environment 
by updating their priors versus conserving cognitive resources for more important 
tasks.  
 Interestingly however, it is worth noting that analyses 4-6 failed to find 
gender differences in heuristic processing using belief updating and entropy as 
predictor variables. A possible explanation for this may simply be power, as 
models 4-6 used far less data than models 1-3, as participants only provided 8 
estimates in the experiment. Additionally, the first four of these estimates were 
thrown out in condition 1, the first two were thrown out in condition 2, and the first 
one was thrown out in condition 3, because the analysis only used estimates 
provided after the initial agent probability switch. Therefore, the gender effect 
may have been too small to defect with the sample size. Future studies will 
attempt to replicate current findings and use a larger sample to test whether 
gender effects exist using belief updating and entropy as predictors of social 
evaluation.  
Limitations  
 As discussed to in the previous section, a limitation to the current study 
was sample size. As a first study, we currently used sample sizes of 
approximately n=50 per group, which may have been too small to detect gender 
effects in our entropy analyses. Additionally, the current findings only apply to 
Western participants, specifically in the United States. Future research should 
look at these effects in cross-cultural samples, as a wealth of research suggests 
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that cooperation is highly modulated by cultural context (see Yamagishi 2011 for 
an in-depth review of cultural effects on social exchanges).  
Conclusions & Future Directions 
 Overall, our experiment supported our predictions that volatility and 
entropy are successful predictors of heuristic evaluations in cooperative 
interactions. Our primary goal for future research is to expand on the current 
model by looking at heuristic evaluations along a continuum rather than as a 
discrete process from social learning. We hope that by extending our Bayesian 
model of entropy and cooperation we can model more dynamic social 
evaluations across a broader range of social interactions. 
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Table 2: Analysis 1 Results: Multilevel Logistic Regression on Heuristic Judge-
ment with Condition, Gender,and Agent Starting Probability as Fixed Effects
and Subject as Random Effect
Dependent variable:
Heuristic Response to Agent Behavior
Gender:male 25.054⇤⇤⇤
(3.110)
Agent prob(.65) 0.406
(2.857)
Condition 2 26.527⇤⇤⇤
(3.330)
Condition 3 25.979⇤⇤⇤
(3.485)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) -0.083
(4.010)
Gender:male x Condition 2 -25.764⇤⇤⇤
(4.313)
Gender:male x Condition 3 -16.325⇤
(8.650)
Agent prob(.65) x Condition 2 0.430
(4.366)
Agent prob(.65):Condition 3 -29.157⇤⇤⇤
(6.789)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) x Condition 2 12.304
(24.858)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) x Condition 3 20.269⇤⇤
(9.720)
Constant -13.135⇤⇤⇤
(2.335)
Observations 11,360
Log Likelihood -111.832
Akaike Inf. Crit. 249.665
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 345.057
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.012
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Table 3: Analysis 2 Results: Multilevel Logistic Regression on Participant Co-
operation with Condition, Gender, and Agent Probability as Fixed Effects and
Subject as Random Effect
Dependent variable:
Participant Cooperation
Gender:male -0.158
(0.415)
Agent prob(.65) 1.183⇤⇤⇤
(0.117)
Condition 2 0.242
(0.420)
Condition 3 -0.104
(0.446)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) -0.354⇤⇤
(0.159)
Gender:male x Condition 2 -0.362
(0.572)
Gender:male x Condition 3 -0.181
(0.590)
Agent prob(.65) x Condition 2 -0.357⇤⇤
(0.158)
Agent prob(.65) x Condition 3 -0.369⇤⇤
(0.171)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) x Condition 2 0.147
(0.217)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) x Condition 3 0.084
(0.229)
Constant -0.937⇤⇤⇤
(0.311)
Observations 11,360
Log Likelihood -6,187.100
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,400.200
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,495.590
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.013
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Table 4: Analysis 3 Results: Multilevel Multinomial Logistic Regression on
Agent Evaluation with Condition, Gender, and Agent Starting Probability as
Fixed Effects and Subject as Random Effect
Dependent variable:
defector neither
(1) (2)
Gender:male  16.213⇤⇤⇤  16.387⇤⇤⇤
(0.088) (0.086)
Agent prob(.65)  0.388⇤⇤⇤  0.205⇤
(0.115) (0.115)
Condition 2  16.213⇤⇤⇤  16.724⇤⇤⇤
(0.088) (0.088)
Condition 3  0.991⇤⇤⇤  1.502⇤⇤⇤
(0.092) (0.092)
Subject 8.565⇤⇤⇤ 8.820⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.044)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) 0.858⇤⇤⇤ 0.899⇤⇤⇤
(0.126) (0.122)
Gender:male x Condition 2 17.088⇤⇤⇤ 17.417⇤⇤⇤
(0.122) (0.120)
Gender:male x Condition 3 2.155⇤⇤⇤ 1.636⇤⇤⇤
(0.103) (0.105)
Agent prob(.65) x Condition 2 0.858⇤⇤⇤  0.711⇤⇤⇤
(0.123) (0.132)
Agent prob(.65) x Condition 3 1.001⇤⇤⇤ 1.378⇤⇤⇤
(0.124) (0.124)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) x Condition 2  2.896⇤⇤⇤  2.216⇤⇤⇤
(0.171) (0.178)
Gender:male x Agent prob(.65) x Condition 3  3.550⇤⇤⇤  3.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.143) (0.141)
Constant 8.565⇤⇤⇤ 8.820⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.044)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 20,008.720 20,008.720
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Participant probability report 0.373 0.218 0.010 1.000
Heuristic response 0.552 0.498 0 1
H crit 0.647 0.000 0.647 0.647
Kullback-Leibler divergence 0.369 0.415 0.000 2.713
Entropy 1.016 0.415 0.647 3.361
Belief update 0.131 0.164 0.000 1.000
Table 6: Analysis 4 Results: Multilevel Model Predicting Belief Updating with
Entropy as Level 1 Predictor, Condition as Fixed Effect, and Subject as Ran-
dom Effect
Dependent variable:
Belief updating
Entropy -0.130⇤⇤⇤
(0.047)
Condition -0.020
(0.024)
Entropy:Condition 0.032
(0.021)
Constant 0.238⇤⇤⇤
(0.054)
Observations 763
Log Likelihood 327.732
Akaike Inf. Crit. -643.464
Bayesian Inf. Crit. -615.641
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 7: Analysis 5 Results: Multilevel Logistic Regression Predicting Heuristic
Judgement using Belief Updating and Entropy as Level 1 Predictors, Condition
as Fixed Effect, and Subject as Random Effect
Dependent variable:
Heuristic Response to Agent Behavior
Belief update -70.587⇤
(42.386)
Entropy -16.305⇤⇤
(7.642)
Condition -5.695⇤
(3.406)
Belief update:Entropy 87.032⇤
(50.479)
Belief update:Condition 33.585
(20.419)
Entropy:Condition 7.769⇤⇤
(3.748)
Belief update:Entropy:Condition -41.001⇤
(24.063)
Constant 20.141⇤⇤⇤
(7.284)
Observations 763
Log Likelihood -120.287
Akaike Inf. Crit. 258.574
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 300.309
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 8: Analysis 6 Results: Multilevel Multinomial Logistic Regression Predict-
ing Agent Evaluation with Belief Updating and Entropy as Level 1 Predictors,
Condition as Fixed Effect and Subject as Random Effect
Dependent variable:
Defector Neither
(1) (2)
Belief update 5 519 11.601
(7.715) (9.055)
Entropy 1.628 3.707⇤
(2.246) (2.239)
Condition -0.832 0.213
( .905) (0.890)
Subject -0.308 -0.728
(1.025) (1.015)
Belief update:Entropy -4.453 -17.950⇤
(7.670) (9.629)
Beli f Update:Condition .323 -3.756
(3.490) (3.670)
Entropy:Condition 1.034 -0.508
(1.009) (1.000)
Belief Update:Entropy:Condition -2.281 5.941
(3.688) (3.947)
Constant -0.308 -0.728
(1.025) (1.015)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,449.898 1,449.898
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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